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BOOK REVIEWS
New Paths of the Law. By Roscoe Pound. Lincoln: The University
of Nebraska Press. 1950. Pp. 69. $2.00.
Now, in mid twentieth century, multitudes of people shout for the
attention of one another, and the shouts are as loud for matters of
small moment as for matters of large importance. The cries of Communists, the propaganda for the United Nations, and the calling of
religious leaders mingle with the noise of those who extol suds, cures,
and candies. This book, consisting of but sixty-nine pages, with two
of those left blank, by its very thinness may succeed in luring attention
away from competing attractions, since here one may, with the expenditure of only a little time, obtain the reaction of one of the giants of
jurisprudence to our confused, complex, and turbulent modern legal
scene. Roscoe Pound, a man who, in his courses at Harvard Law
School, made generations of law students acquainted with the world's
great juristic thought, who himself added one of the most outstanding
contributions to that thought made by any American jurist, and whose
particular genius has been his ability to draw panoramic pictures of the
large scale movements in human thought during the course of centuries,
is qualified, as few men of our time are qualified, to comment on the
large scale significance of what is happening in the disturbed legal order
of our age. If this reads a little like a eulogy, it is to be noted that
when the literal truth about a man reads like a eulogy, that man's mature
comments on the life of his time are worth a brief pause to read,
especially when his comments are so terse that the required pause can be
brief.
The book consists of three lectures dielivered by Pound at the University of Nebraska in 1950. In the first lecture, called "The Path of
Liberty," he expounds the idea that law in the nineteenth century sought
to realize a maximum of free individual self assertion, and he sets forth
many influences which caused the law to move along such a path. First,
the period from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century was an era of
discovery, colonization, and development. A time of opportunity calls
for liberty so that individuals may be free to seize their opportunities.
Also there was the influence of Magna Carta and the Declaration of
Independence; of the doctrine of the common law rights of Englishmen
and the theory of the natural rights of man; of Kant's theory of allowing the maximum amount of free assertion of the will of each person
compatible with a like assertion of the wills of others; of Maine's view
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that legal history is the history of progress from status to contract; of
Bentham's view that happiness is to be found in individual freedom.
These and other influences all contributed to the movement of law in
the path of liberty. But toward the end of the century a new movement
set in. The "era of opportunity was felt to be over," Pound writes.
Individual freedom began to be limited on behalf of the interests of
society. Since then the movement has accelerated, and Pound points to
numerous restrictions on freedom of contract, on the right of the individual to the free use of his property, and the like. The first lecture is
background. In it Pound summarizes much that he had written many
years before. It contains his strengths and weaknesses, already much
commented on, so that there is no need of rehearsing them here.
In the next two lectures Pound discusses two new paths which are
beginning to be discernible in the legal trends of our time, but to neither
of which we are yet irrevocably committed. One of these Pound calls
the humanitarian path, and his second lecture is a 'discussion of it. "In
the English-speaking world, until the present generation, security has
meant security from aggression or fault or wrong-doing of others. Today the term security is being used to mean much more-how much
more it is not easy to say. But certainly it is made to include security
against one's own fault, improvidence, or ill luck or even defects of
character." Whereas tort liability had been a consequence of fault, "a
developing humanitarian idea seems to think of repairing at someone's
expense all loss to everyone, no matter how caused." Two new theories
of liability have appeared; one Pound calls the insurance theory, and the
other he calls the involuntary Good Samaritan theory. Under the insurance theory, liability is imposed upon someone more able to bear
the loss-such as the employer if an employee be injured, or the
manufacturer if a consumer is injured in the use of a defective
manufactured article-and the loss is then passed on to the public
by regarding it as part of the cost of production to be included in
prices. Pound is skeptical about the operation of this theory in practice,
because it is usual that one agency of the government fixes prices,
whereas a jury or another administrative agency assesses 'damages, and
there is no coordination between them. Those who control prices are
zealous to keep them low, but those who impose liability are zealous to
afford the maximum relief to the injured. In practice Pound thinks law
is called upon to play the involuntary Good Samaritan, to pull the injured out of the ditch, bind his wounds, and pay his hotel bill. The
law then drafts someone else to foot the expense. This comes down,
says Pound, to the Marxian aphorism, "To everyone according to his
wants; from everyone according to his means." Pound concludes the
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lecture by pointing out that much of the humanitarian program, if not
beyond attainment, is beyond attainment by means of law.
The other of the two new paths of the law Pound calls the authoritarian path, and it is plain that he does not like it. This path is one in
which a service state controls all individual activities and all productive
effort, provides full services to everybody, and solves all ills. For freedom of individual action is substituted a different kind of freedom,
namely freedom fiom want and freedom from fear. Pound uses the
term "service state" instead of the more common "welfare state" because the latter term seems to him to be a boast. Whether such a state
produces welfare is at least debatable. Pound repeatedly says that he
has no objection to a state rendering services; he does object to the state
taking over the whole field. Already the state has become jealous of
service performed by anybody else. "The service state easily becomes
an omnicompetent state, with bureaus of e.x officio experts and propaganda activities carried on at public expense." Pound also elaborates on
the idea that, "It is characteristic of the service state to make lavish
promises of satisfying desires which it calls rights." On the specific
matter of what the service state may mean to lawyers, Pound contrasts
a profession, in which the members render public service by the exercise of their own individual initiative and talents, with a regime under
which what were formerly professional men become employees, members of an employee group, represented by employee unions, and interested primarily in their pay. It is obvious that Pound is no advocate of
socialized medicine, nor socialized law, in the direction of which we
have been inconspicuously moving as more and more lawyers fail to
hang up. their shingles and instead become employees on staffs of government agencies.
Pound concludes with a declaration of faith that "what was found
for civilization while law was treading the path of liberty will not be
lost." We will not take the authoritarian path. There will be a
broadening of objectives but not a sacrifice of values already attained.
By many who have identified liberalism with belief in the welfare
state this book may be regarded as the product of a great man of yesteryear who has failed to keep pace with the times. Pound, the sociological jurist who did much to set in motion a change in the law from
individualism to an emphasis on social interests, is in danger of suffering the fate of reformers who launch reforms that get out of hand, become revolutions, and in the end lop off the heads of the reformers who
launched them. Pound's head is probably in no immediate danger, but
Pound himself is in danger of being labeled a hidebound reactionary during these days when men are more impetuous than wise. But it seems
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to be characteristic of the human race that in times of change it goes
too far, and then falls back, thus reaching in two movements the place
where wiser leaders would have stopped. Pound's present position may
be the one we reach in the end.
FRANK HANFT.

University of North Carolina
School of Law
Chapel Hill, N. C.
Primer of Procedure. By Delmar Karlen. 1 Madison, Wisconsin:
Campus Publishing Company. 1950. Pp. 525. $6.50.
I remember reading a review of a child's book (of the kind read
nightly ad nauseum by parents to tiny tots) in which the reviewer suggested his incompetence since only an infant could give an adequate
judgment on such a book. Since this "primer" is exactly that, designed,
as the author tells us, to give entering law students a basis understanding of civil procedure and to help orient them in the legal world, it
should perhaps be reviewed by a student just entering law school. It
could' be objected that such a student could not properly evaluate the
book until he had studied sufficient law to tell how good the book was,
and by that time he would have become disqualified because he would
have forgotten how ignorant he was to start with. Still, new devices
for breaking in the student are commonly being tried by we who have
that job, and if one of us may write such a book, another may be excused for reviewing it.
The tenor of the book is shown in the introductory quotation from
Mr. Justice Holmes: "We need education in the obvious more than
investigation of the obscure." In 113 pages the author gives a broad
outline of procedure from summons to appeal, keeping his eye always
on the normal course of things and giving only a preliminary warning
that practically every sentence in the book is subject to some exception
or qualification. He then devotes fifty pages to the common law writs
and a summary of equity, ending with a glance at the steps taken toward reform and unification. At each procedural step the text is keyed
into an actual record comprising 280 pages of pleadings, trariscript,
appellate papers, briefs, and opinion. The book concludes with a reprint
of approximately half of the Federal Rules, as an example of a modern
procedural system.
This material, according to Professor Karlen, can be used either as
supplementary reading for the student or as the sole foundation for a
two-hour introductory course. As supplementary reading the adequacy
1
Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
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of the book depends upon that which is being supplemented. If the
students are simply given a few lectures on law school and legal procedures the book should be excellent for the purpose of aiding them in
the preparation and understanding of their other courses. If a short
course on procedure, with a longer one to follow in a later year, is
taught from a casebook such as Atkinson & Chadbourn, Introduction to
Civil Procedure; or if the freshman orientation takes the form of a
course in legal method from texts such as Fryer & Benson or Dowling,
Patterson, & Powell, Professor Karlen's primer will materially expand
and clarify some of the procedural concepts taught. If, however, in the
freshman year a complete course is given from Atkinson & Chadbourn,
or Scott & Simpson, Cases on Civil Procedure,this book would do little
except to give the student a broad preliminary outline of the material
he is about to cover in detail.
As the foundation of a course for the beginning student I can only
say that I am wholly convinced that the materials are entirely adequate
for Professor Karlen's course and quite inadequate for the introductory
procedure course which I teach.2 My feeling is that great virtue lies in
the process pounding into the students the essential requirements of the
various judicial remedies and in forcing the students to dig for them in
the cases. For these reasons the short textual treatment of the forms of
action would not do for my course.
Whether or not any particular law professor will like this book will
first depend upon whether or not he will agree that Professor Karlen's
purpose is a desirable one, and secondly whether or not he feels that
the purpose has been accomplished. Karlen justifies his simplified
approach on the grounds that more sophisticated approaches have proved
unsatisfactory. The lack of detail in the main body of the primer, the
failure to note exceptions and qualifications, may cause some to shudder,
but much similar material is found in all our freshman lectures when
we use some half-truth to ease a student over a procedural stumbling
block. After all, 113 pages contains considerably more detail than does
Atkinson & Chadbourn's six pages or Scott & Simpson's nine.
In one respect Karlen has limited the usefulness of the book. As an
educator of Wisconsin lawyers he has in some instances stuck closely
to Wisconsin procedure in order to get a firm footing and avoid the
shifting sands of attempting to describe all systems of procedure at
once. For this reason a few parts of the book will need some external
explanation when used in any other state. For example, the Wisconsin
"order to show cause" is explained without any attempt to indicate that
in many other jurisdictions such a procedure is called a motion for
a temporary restraining order, or that other states have other proSee Mueller, There Is Madness in Our Methods, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 93 (1950).
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cedures bearing that name. Similarly, Karlen speaks of the summary
judgment as being of prime importance without indicating that it is not
available in most state courts. It would not have been too difficult or
too confusing to have footnoted alternative names and procedures as
they occur in other jurisdictions. One other fault is that occasionally
the author in attempting to avoid "exceptions and qualifications" shows
only one side of a genuine controversy. For instance, he gives the
Blackstonian view of the derivation of the action of case from trespass
by virtue of the Statute of Westminster II, without the faintest hint
that Plucknett or Dix have hat anything to say on the matter. A single
page8 could have adequately presented the whole picture for the student's judgment.
On the whole I think Karlen's purpose and accomplishment an excellent one. From what I think I know of what the entering student does
not know I would conclude that this book should be very helpful and I
would wholeheartedly recommend its use to him. For the professor
assigned to teach introductory procedure or to give the aforementioned
few lectures the book should be a valuable source of notes explaining
some rather complex concepts in simple terms understandable to the
beginner. It certainly should sit in fair numbers upon every law school's
library shelves.
FRANx J. TRELEASE.
Professor of Law
University of Wyoming
Laramie, Wyoming.
The Papers of Walter Clark.* Edited by Aubrey Lee Brooks and
Hugh Talmage Lefler. Volume II, 1902-1924. Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press. 1950. Pp. 608. $6.00.
The presentation of Judge Clark by Mr. Brooks in his two volumes,
"The Fighting Judge" and "The Letters and Papers," addressed to the
layreader as well as the lawyer, very properly by-passed the citations
and discussions of the cases and opinions which a Law Review, addressed more especially to the lawyer, can more properly presentcases that made the landmarks of his career and which flowed into the
whirlpool of both legal and political controversy. A review of these
"E.g., MORGAN, THE STUDY OF LAW 106 (2d ed. 1948); ATKINsON & CHADBOURN, CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 18 (1948).

*A review of The Papers of Walter Clark by Mr. H. S. Ward recently
appeared in a leading North Carolina newspaper. Since Mr. Ward is a contemporary of Judge Clark, he is especially well qualified to give an insight into the
character and times of that great North Carolinian. For this reason, the LAW
REVIEW requested Mr. Ward to follow up his review with a comment on the book
directed particularly to the members of the North Carolina Bar.
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cases would have given the layreader too much of a law brief, not
wholesome to his taste. The omission, therefore, leaves interesting law
history which reflects the character of his subject and speaks for itself
without extensive narrative. These cases, that so vividly reflect his
official life, are presented for that purpose. They offended the type of
lawyer that represented the larger interest, then just springing to its
feet in this state and pluming its wings for a higher and stronger flight.
But for these opinions and discussions of them, the general public would
have seen nothing in him but a faithful, public servant, active in magazine and newspaper writing, showing his interest in the backward in
life's race and his fearlessness of the larger selfish activities which by
superior ingenuity and bigness imposed on the masses, as he thought.
The general public approved these writings, but with no polemic spirit.
And by these writings alone he would not have become the storm petrel
he was. The lawyers of his day were better known, more reverenced
and admired than were law books and the opinions they contained.
In the distinguished group which graced the big lobby of the old
Yarborough Hotel in Raleigh fifty years ago, the four major railroad
companies with their general and division counsels, together with the
shorter intrastate lines predominated. In 1833 and '35, the Legislature
granted a charter to the Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company to
build a road connecting the two cities and put in exemption from taxation for unlimited time. In a suit in our court, Pearson writing, our
court held the exemption did not include the franchise. Reid vs. Railroad, 64 N. C. 144. A corporate franchise, independently of tangible
property for taxation had theretofore received little, if any, judicial consideration. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the decision was reversed. 80 U. S. 568. (What does the lawyer of today
say to the proposition of a legislature exempting from taxation beyond
the limit of its own life and binding subsequent legislatures by it? The
"Sun do move." Appellate courts are slow and hesitant at innovation,
but civilization has what takes the place of a modem implement which
man calls the bulldozer, by which he moves the mountain to the valley.)
This railroad company afterwards acquired lines connecting Weldon
with Kinston and insisted on continuing its exemption. In 1891 Sheriff
Allsbrook of Halifax demanded tax on both franchise and tangible property. The railroad enjoined. The case was heard by Judge H. G. Connor. He split his judgment, seeing the franchise and certain tangible
property in a different light. Both sides appealed. 110 N. C. 137. The
court was Merrimon, C. J., Shepherd, Avey, Davis, Clark. Clark had
been on the bench about three years and had displeased the Yarborough
lobby sufficiently to align him with Avery. Merrimon and Shepherd,
safely conservative; Avery and Clark, surely and displeasingly radical.
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Where was Davis? No finer spirit ever sat on that or any other bench.
This was February, 1892. He had been sick through the winter and
died the following August. Several conferences, of course, were held
by the court on this case which he attended, but on the day set for the
vote he was quite sick. With him absent, it was expected there would
be a dog-fall and Judge Connor affirmed in both appeals. They were
right about Avery. He was as liberal as Clark, but without Clark's
dynamic energy, impatient, resentful of criticism and in fact irritable
of controversy. Clark, patient, undiscourageable, insensible to insult,
"His soul was satisfied as with marrow and fatness" as he faced a contest. He fought the policy and for the principle and not the person.
At two o'clock, the hour for the conference and the vote, Clark's carriage drove up to Judge Davis' house and Clark went in and soon came
out with Judge Davis leaning on his arm. They drove to the court
building and the hope of the dog-fall vanished.
Ten years passed. The Machinery Act of 1901 put the Corporation
Commission in perplexity with respect to the taxation of the intangible
property of railroads. Gov. Jarvis and F. M. Simmons in the campaign of 1900 had promised Col. Andrews, the star performer in the
railroad drama and a powerful man, that the railroads would not be
taxed on their franchises separately from their tangible property. It was
contended from official reports that it amounted to around nine million
dollars. The sheriff of Washington County, J. W. Jackson, brought an
action for mandamus against the Corporation Commission to require it
to assess the franchises. judge Robinson, at chambers, dismissed; and
the appeal was argued, first week of February Term, 1902. 130 N. C.
385.
The ten years that had passed since the Allsbrook case had shown
Clark's handiwork sufficiently to keep alive the resentment to his "injustice to the interest," but he had run the steamroller over them at the
Greensboro Convention of 1902 before the opinions were handed down.
Notwithstanding this lessening of the furor, when the suit was brought
he was accused of himself having it brought. There was some excuse
for this charge. I do not doubt that his writings in the Arena and
newspaper interviews brought it to Jackson's attention. The News &
Observer exposed the matter at 'different times and it was asserted that
the editorials showed the touch of a skilled legal hand and it was charged
that Judge Clark inspired them. The editor of that paper was himself
a lawyer but it was asserted that Clark's hand was undisguisable. I
note with admiration that the -lawyers who were resentful to Judge
Clark's liberalism could have easily been mistaken, but they were not
McCarthys. Far indeed from it. They were the great men of this state
in all the qualities of Christian personality. There were other skilled
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hands in Raleigh then than Clark's. Anyhow and however, Jackson
got the information and he was cocked and primed as much as Allsbrook. He contended that the franchise was as clearly property as the
rolling stock and was included by implication in the word "property."
The court held the case five months. It voted three to two to reverse
and to order the Superior Court to issue the Writ, Montgomery, Douglas and Clark, Faircloth and Furches dissenting. After both opinions
were written, as will be seen by Douglas' opinion, there was a shift of
the wind. It was in this opinion that Furches said "The case is big
enough to fall of its own weight." Plaintiff showed by official report
of the railroads that nine million dollars worth of property was escaping
taxation. In the last week of May, with both opinions on the conference table but not filed, Judge Montgomery asked for further consideration. I believe the proper name "Shiras" since the decision of the
famous income tax case in the United States Supreme Court, which
caused the Constitutional Amendment known as "The 'Income Tax
Amendment," has reached the dictionaryfand the books on English and
been participialised; so that we say that at this eleventh hour, Judge
Montgomery shirased the plaintiff. The judgment below was therefore
affirmed.
Other citations that could easily be selected from the Reports during
Judge Clark's career on the bench would be easily available, but we
haven't the space, and a clear, correct and sufficient insight into the
"inward parts" of Judge Clark are reflected by these two sufficiently
for any thoughtful person to see what he was and all that he was. He
was not a socialist, nor a believer in any form of collectivism in government, but a believer in a capitalistic democracy. His liberalism consisted in a conviction that a laissez faire or non-interference doctrine of
government would leave the masses and unprivileged classes of mankind the suffering victim of superior ingenuity, and the combinations of
capital (what Judge Brandeis called "bigness") would result in commercial chaos and general poverty. One of the top celebrities of the
lobby of classical learning quoting Brankenbury in Richard the Third,
said of him: "G-D-him, he's a perturbed spirit." The difference of
opinion between the conservative and the liberal is with us yet and has
no promise of -disappearing. Fortunately, however, the North Carolina
court has overcome it and no longer suffers its imputations, but in the
political arena like Tennyson's brook, "Men may come and men may
go, but I go on forever."
H. S. WARD.
Member North Carolina Bar,
Washington, North Carolina.

